0 Introduction

    In modern warfare and armed conflicts, drones have become an essential component of weapons and equipment. The Russian military's special military operations in Ukraine have significantly expanded the scale and application areas of drones, especially FPV drones (First Person View), in combat. They not only provide battlefield observation, reconnaissance, correction of air strikes and artillery fire, tracking of strike results, but also are used to kill enemy combat equipment and living forces. This article aims to analyze the FPV unmanned aerial vehicles used by both sides in the conflict on the Russia Ukraine battlefield and their operational prospects.

    Characteristics of unmanned aerial vehicle operations on the Russian Ukrainian battlefield

    The Russian military was the first to actively use drones (including attack drones) in combat in Syria, putting their drones to the test of practical combat and practicing anti drone weapons and methods. In the Nagorno Karabakh armed conflict from September to November 2020, Azerbaijani attack UAVs (including patrol missiles, mainly produced by Türkiye and Israel) destroyed a large number of Armenian air defense weapons, armored vehicles and other equipment, triggering a debate on whether the main battle tanks can continue to be used in the high intensity military conflict. On social media, there have been many obviously promotional short videos that make people believe that the armor of tanks cannot withstand precise strikes from drones. Some military commentators believe that Azerbaijan's large-scale use of drones has fundamentally changed the course of the war and raised questions about the use of traditional armored vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons. This large-scale participation of drones in local wars provides some key materials that contribute to the scientific practical analysis of the usage characteristics of drones and troops in modern armed conflicts, as well as anti drone methods. The analysis results have attracted high attention from military analysts and helped draw conclusions about the possible characteristics of future operations.

    It should be pointed out that so far, in special military operations, the Russian military has not only used existing Russian drones, but also various types of commercial drones (rotary wing aircraft) from major foreign commercial drone companies. They mainly perform flight reconnaissance tasks in tactical units. In special military operations, such drones are used to monitor the battlefield, conduct visual aerial reconnaissance of targets, correct the firepower of artillery, mortars, tanks, and automatic grenade launchers launched from concealed fire positions, test the effectiveness of firepower damage, and release interference and forward intelligence. In addition, these drones are currently being used to carry improvised air dropped ammunition (explosives) for aerial strikes against enemy equipment and living forces. However, in the early stages of special military operations, these actions were not widely carried out, but were carried out sporadically. They are very suitable for carrying out "intimidation" missions and exerting sustained psychological pressure on enemies.

    Analysis of special military operations experience shows that currently, drones, including commercial drones, are being used more actively as patrol ammunition for aerial strikes against armored tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, radar, anti-aircraft missile systems, and anti-aircraft artillery systems. This significantly expands and simplifies the variety of strike and reconnaissance drones used at the tactical level.

    Application of FPV unmanned aerial vehicles in combat on the Russian Ukrainian battlefield

    In special military operations, both the Russian and Ukrainian armies have used FPV drones and achieved good results. This is a relatively inexpensive rotary wing drone, often handmade and carrying warheads (explosives). According to the type and carrying capacity of the rotary wing aircraft, its warhead is manufactured based on standard ammunition such as RPG-7 grenades, RKG-3 anti tank shaped charge grenades, RPG-26 anti tank rocket launchers, and mortar shells. The Russian military is currently producing universal ammunition for such drones.

Figure 1 FPV drone carrying RPG-7 grenade

2.1 Analysis of Advantages of FPV Drones

    FPV drones have considerable speed, excellent maneuverability, and decent carrying capacity relative to their size, allowing them to fly at low altitudes and sometimes even close to the ground, making them difficult to detect with the naked eye and to destroy with infantry and other weapons. Due to their low radar visibility and the fact that their electric motors do not leave infrared wake, it is difficult to use anti-aircraft missiles to destroy them.

   The FPV drone developed using a 9-inch (22.86 cm) carbon fiber frame is capable of reaching speeds of over 100 km/h in seconds, transporting ammunition (explosives) weighing up to 3 kg to the target area. It should be noted that, apart from its shorter range, these other characteristics are comparable to the combat technical indicators of the "Lancet 3" cruise missile.

   The flight of FPV drones does not rely on satellite navigation, and in some cases, there is even no autopilot module, which not only greatly simplifies the structure of the drone, reduces its cost, but also reduces the impact of enemy electronic warfare equipment on it. And when using thermal imaging cameras, they can even perform tasks at night. Although their cost will significantly increase in this situation, it still does not exceed the cost of destroyed or damaged enemy combat equipment.

   The FPV drone is controlled in real-time by soldiers wearing virtual reality glasses, which have LCD screens displaying images from the drone's camera. Well trained operators can perform flexible maneuvers between obstacles, not only flying at high speeds in forests, cities or industrial areas, buildings, but also entering windows or military equipment hatches to kill or injure individual soldiers. Another important feature is that FPV drone operators can quickly respond to obstacles, threats, or sudden changes in the situation during flight, maneuver, and approach the target again. In the short video released on the Internet, we can see that an FPV UAV completed a rapid maneuver at the end of the flight when attacking a moving tank, hitting the rear of the tank with weak protection.

Figure 2: Operators controlling the flight of FPV unmanned aerial vehicles

    What is particularly noteworthy is that even homemade FPV drones can effectively attack moving targets (with drone flight speeds reaching 140 km/h), which is difficult to achieve using barrel guns, mortars, and multiple rocket launchers for firing. According to some sources, up to 200 rounds of ammunition are required to ensure the destruction of a single tank moving in a straight line at the longest distance. Therefore, in some cases, FPV drones can replace anti tank missile systems for destroying or paralyzing lightly armored targets or vehicles, with their warheads more than sufficient to deal with such targets. Unlike the operator of an anti tank missile system (whose missiles fly almost straight), the operator of an FPV drone can alter the drone's flight trajectory, for example, directing the FPV drone directly to the enemy's rear bunker entrance, or, as mentioned earlier, hitting the weakest part of the target protection. This does not mean that FPV drones will soon completely replace anti tank missile systems, but they are indeed capable of completing some tasks.

    According to the developers and manufacturers, the cost of homemade FPV drones varies depending on the electronic devices they carry, ranging from 30000 to 50000 rubles (approximately 350 to 600 US dollars), which is much lower than the cost of destroyed or damaged military and special equipment (which is one percent or even one thousandth of the latter).

    It should be noted that foreign countries attach great importance to the research and development of this equipment. For example, although Poland is clearly not a leading country in the field of drone system development, it is still closely tracking and analyzing the progress of the Ukrainian conflict. WB Electronics S.A. Defense Group had already developed the DragonFly light FPV attack drone as early as 2016, which is used to destroy enemy light armored vehicles, cars, command posts, living force assembly sites, ammunition depots, and fuel oil warehouses. Depending on the task, the drone can use different types of ammunition: energy gathering, fragmentation, explosive, or incendiary. The drone weighs 5 kg, has a range of up to 10 km, a flight altitude of 3.5-200 m, and a endurance time of up to 20 minutes.

Figure 3 Polish "Dragonfly" light FPV attack drone

    In August 2023, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense approved the delivery of SkyKnight-2 attack drones to the military. The drone is equipped with artificial intelligence components and has a payload mass of 2.5 kg. This drone can be used for suicide attacks and is also equipped with ammunition throwing devices. The drone is operated by an operator, but can also automatically capture and attack designated fixed and moving targets. The researchers claim that the drone can fly silently, counter electronic warfare equipment, and even autonomously kill targets in the event of losing contact with the operator. The developers also claim that operator training only takes one week.

Figure 4: Ukraine SkyKnight-2 Light FPV Attack Drone

2.2 Analysis of Disadvantages of Drones

    Despite these advantages, there are also some drawbacks to homemade FPV drones, such as:

    Limited range;

    The reliability of the structure of FPV drones and their explosives, especially the circuit of the closure, is low;

    The camera images are transmitted through analog channels, which are susceptible to interference, lack encryption protection, and have a limited quantity;

    FPV drones and their operators can be targeted and located using the simplest electronic reconnaissance methods, with obvious vulnerability;

    Cannot be used at night (unless using a thermal imaging camera);

    The operator approaches the front line (within the kill zone outside the engineering shelter);

    Operators need to be accompanied by protection when using "virtual reality glasses" to operate drones, as they cannot see the situation around them at this time;

    Operators need a considerable amount of time to prepare (several months, including at least one month of simulated practice time).

2.3 FPV drone records on the Russia Ukraine battlefield

    The experience of special military operations shows that the large-scale use of FPV drones can achieve the best results. In early June 2023, the Russian 42nd Motorized Infantry Division used an FPV drone swarm in the direction of Olehovsk and destroyed 9 pieces of equipment in a short period of time, including 2 T-72M1 tanks, 1 M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, 1 M113 armored personnel carrier, 2 armored vehicles (including 1 International MaxxPro), 2 MAZ-6317 trucks, and 1 HMMWV pickup truck. In the surveillance video, it can be seen that trucks and pickup trucks were destroyed within a few minutes, and some vehicles were hit while traveling. As of early August 2023, according to publicly available data, the use of FPVs by the Russian military in special military operations in Ukraine is as follows:

    Total usage: 157 times;

    Number of destroyed: 43 aircraft;

    Number of damaged: 21 aircraft;

    Unknown number of takeoffs: 61 times;

    Confirm the number of off target takeoffs: 7 times;

    Number of takeoffs that hit the target: 25 times.

    The number of times each type of target is hit is as follows:

    Light armored vehicles: 33 times;

    Car: 25 times;

    House: 21 times;

    Tanks and special vehicles: 18 times;

    Ship: 3 times;

    Artillery and mortar: 2 times;

    Radar and communication equipment: 2 times;

    Self propelled artillery: 1 time.

2.4 Improvement measures of the Russian military for the combat application of FPV unmanned aerial vehicles

    Based on the performance of FPV drones on the Russian Ukrainian battlefield, Russia has proposed a series of targeted improvement measures in drone manufacturing, upgrading, operator training, tactical use, and other aspects.

    One is to address the issue of a lack of skilled drone operators

    There is a problem with the operation of FPV drones. Unlike ordinary civilian drone operators, FPV drone operators cannot use electronic devices to maintain the drone's flight altitude and direction, and fly according to the pre-set trajectory points in the flight mission. As mentioned earlier, in order to simplify and reduce the cost of disposable drones, such electronic "assistant" devices are not included in the drone structure. In this case, it is necessary to rely on the skills acquired by the operator through training. In the Russian military participating in combat, there is a shortage of well-trained operators of unmanned aerial vehicles (including FPV drones) and a shortage of dedicated operators. In this situation, even if the military can obtain sufficient supply of industrially produced FPV drones, there is still a question mark as to whether they can proficiently use them.

    In view of this, the Russian military is taking measures to address this issue. According to media reports, training centers have been established in the rear of special military operations to provide training on the operation and combat use of rotary wing drones (including FPV drones) for specially selected soldiers.

    The second is to increase the supply of FPV unmanned aerial vehicles

    Analysis of the experience of special military operations shows that the Russian military currently lacks industrially produced small (micro and mini) unmanned aerial vehicles that can perform both optical visual reconnaissance and kill enemy combat equipment and personnel. Although Russia has recently invested sufficient attention in the production of short, medium, and long-range drones and cruise missiles, there has been little news about the research and industrial production of micro and mini drones (including attack drones). In this field, the top priority must be to equip the troops with tactical drones that are small in size, lightweight, and capable of causing damage to the enemy. As we have previously pointed out, such drones (including FPV drones) must be part of the complete set of combat equipment for tactical level units (platoons).

    In November 2022, a design bureau in St. Petersburg developed and produced a "Hydrangea" combat drone, which was positioned as the "first mass-produced FPV drone" by researchers. According to media reports, 2000 drones have been sent to the special military operation area, with a production capacity of 120 drones per day and 3000 drones per month. The body size of the drone is 7 inches (17.78 cm), the payload mass is 2 kg, the flight duration is 6-8 minutes, and the effective killing distance to the target is 3 km. In addition, it is said to have high resistance to electronic warfare interference and can use various types of payloads and throwing systems.

Figure 5 "Hydrangea" FPV combat drone ready for shipment

    According to media reports, Russia is still developing and producing FPV drones such as the "Russian Drone", "Gadfly", "Gasterow", and "Vampire", which have been successfully applied in special military operations. At the same time, according to photos released on the Internet, hundreds of FPV drones have been produced by folk enthusiasts and are ready to be sent to special military operation areas.

    In addition, there are workshops in the special military operations area that manufacture FPV drone components, drone ammunition (explosives) based on standard ammunition, and their delivery systems through 3D printing. Commercial drones are reprogrammed (firmware upgraded) to prevent enemy interception or interference with drone control and navigation channels.

    The third is to continuously improve the tactical use of FPV unmanned aerial vehicles

    In special military operations, the tactical use of FPV drones has been continuously improved. For example, a large number of short videos on the Internet show that the FPV UAV carrying a lethal explosive warhead accurately hit the enemy's combat equipment, special equipment, strongholds, bunkers, firepower points and soldiers in trenches, thus saving artillery and mortar ammunition. In addition, FPV drones can also kill enemy soldier squads or even individual soldiers.

    In order to ensure the destruction of towed artillery made of non combustible materials on enemy positions, the Russian military has used special FPV unmanned aerial vehicles, whose warheads carry energy charges or explosive charges, as well as fuel and lubricant mixtures. After the warhead detonates, an additional ignition point will be generated, which can not only render the cannon ineffective, but also cause its ammunition to explode and kill its personnel.

    In combat practice, the Russian military has also found that the combination of FPV drones and reconnaissance drones has the best effect. The latter can not only detect targets, but also evaluate the destructive effect. For example, the Russian military once used a swarm of Geranium-2 cruise missiles to strike Ukraine's military infrastructure, and according to reports from Ukraine and some Western sources, these actions were modified by Mohajer 6 reconnaissance drones.

    Anti FPV unmanned aerial vehicle combat practice on the Russian Ukrainian battlefield

    On the battlefield between Russia and Ukraine, both sides have adopted various anti drone (including FPV drones) equipment and methods to intercept low altitude incoming drones.

3.1 Portable and Vehicle mounted Electronic Warfare Systems

    At present, the demand for anti drone weapons by the Russian tactical forces is partially met by portable electronic countermeasures systems, including systems developed by Russia, which are supplied by the Russian Ministry of Defense or purchased and supplied by volunteers or military personnel themselves. Some of these portable electronic warfare devices are designed in the form of rifles commonly used by soldiers, including unmanned aerial vehicle detection modules, as well as unmanned aerial vehicle control and navigation channel interference modules. For example, the portable anti drone system produced by the "Special Technology Center" Limited Liability Company can suppress the control channel of drones at a distance of 2 km and suppress the navigation channel of drones at a distance of 10 km. In addition, the Rex-1 and Rex-2 portable anti drone systems produced by ZalaAero Group, also have similar functions.

    Both the Russian and Ukrainian military are using vehicle mounted small anti FPV unmanned aerial vehicle electronic countermeasures equipment to interfere with the communication frequency of most "civilian" unmanned aerial vehicles, causing FPV unmanned aerial vehicles to deviate from their targets in the final stages of flight.

Figure 7 Anti FPV unmanned aerial vehicle electronic countermeasures equipment installed on Ukrainian armored vehicles

    The "Anti Industrial Spy Laboratory" joint-stock company in St. Petersburg, Russia has developed and produced a vehicle mounted "Poseidon" jamming system for suppressing the control and data transmission channels of FPV drones, operating in the frequency band of 868/915/1300/2400MHz. In addition, there are other companies in Russia producing portable jamming systems.

                            (a)Armored vehicle mounted type                                               (b)portable

    However, most experts are skeptical of such devices because they are themselves sources of radio radiation that could prompt the enemy to take action against armored vehicles. And the interference signal it generates is not selective, so it will not only interfere with enemy drones, but also with our own drones within the suppression distance. Most of these devices are almost entirely "self-made" by enthusiasts using components purchased from foreign electronic markets, and their combat performance and reliability are far inferior to industrial production equipment. However, it must be acknowledged that they have played a certain role in combating the conversion of "civilian" drones into "combat" drones.

3.2 Anti drone smoothbore gun

    According to some participants in special military operations, to deal with FPV drones with insufficient structural strength and low altitude high-speed flight, they can use smoothbore guns to launch large shotgun shells for attack. For example, using a 12 caliber (18.5 mm) hunting rifle with a barrel length of 760 mm, equipped with a barrel extender (total length up to 100 mm), reflex sights, Magnum bullets (cartridge length 76 mm), and № 3-1 (3.5-4 mm) shotgun shells, experienced hunters can successfully hunt geese flying at 100 m altitude at speeds of 80 km/h or approximately 20 m/s. To achieve this goal, it is best to use magazine style "pump action" rifles, as semi-automatic rifles are less stable and typically require higher ammunition quality.

    In addition, there are some smoothbore guns with calibers of 10 (19.7 mm), 8 (21.2 mm), and 4 (26.5 mm), but they are relatively heavy, have longer barrels, and considerable recoil. Based on the KS-23 rifled gun with a caliber of 23 mm currently used by the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Russia has manufactured the TOZ-123-01 "Duck-4" hunting smoothbore gun with a caliber of 4 (26 mm). The length of the gun is 1220 mm, the weight is 6.5 kg, and the recoil is easily accepted by medium sized shooters.

3.3 Anti drone protection network

    In order to deal with patrol ammunition, including FPV drones, the Ukrainian military has adopted various clever methods. For example, pulling up a metal wire mesh above the artillery in the firepower position can help detonate the warhead of the FPV drone in advance.

Figure 9: The Ukrainian military uses metal mesh to defend against cruise missiles and FPV drones

3.4 Comprehensive Measures for Anti UAV Operations

    It must be pointed out that all of the above equipment is not always effective for FPV drones flying at low altitude and high speed, so it should be used according to specific situations. In summary, the primary practical recommendations for improving personal and equipment immunity from drone (including FPV drones) attacks should include the following measures:

    Continuously observe the air situation;

    When FPV drones appear, promptly issue warning signals and action instructions to personnel;

    Cover the battlefield with a protective net;

    Equip the troops with portable electronic warfare systems;

    Designate the firepower equipment on duty to destroy (prevent approach) FPV drones;

    Properly set up the necessary number of trenches and shelters for personnel and equipment, and carry out meticulous camouflage.

    This is the minimum necessary measures list for countering FPV drones, which should be implemented comprehensively. It must be understood that in modern armed conflicts, the task of countering FPV drones has firmly taken a place in the anti drone measures system and can be quite successfully resolved.

4 Insights and Suggestions

    Special military operations intuitively demonstrate that in modern warfare, the side with overwhelming air superiority still holds the advantage. But unlike armed conflicts in the past few decades, this advantage is now partially achieved through the large-scale use of various types of drones, including FPV drones. The use of drones leads to the loss of personnel and combat equipment, prompting the deployment of a large number of troops and equipment to counterattack them, and has a sustained negative psychological impact on personnel.

    By analyzing the combat experience of FPV drones in special military operations, a conclusion can be drawn that it is necessary to develop and industrialize the production of such advanced drones and their corresponding ammunition. Their practical application in special military operations not only helps to summarize their usage experience, but also facilitates timely design revisions to develop more modern equipment of this kind.

    In the near future, FPV drones will be able to replace anti tank missiles through rational structural design and production. In addition, it can be expected that in future combat processes, FPV drones will adopt swarm warfare and replace cluster artillery ammunition and multiple rocket launcher systems.

5 Conclusion

    In summary, the experience of special military operations indicates that the primary task at present should be to persistently conduct theoretical and practical research to develop and validate new effective methods to deal with enemy drones (including FPV drones), and to study their results. Then, it is necessary to incorporate and adopt these methods in guiding documents to ensure timely and effective combat training for military command structures and units (forces), and to carry out relevant educational activities in military academies to utilize the positive results obtained.