introduction

Unmanned aerial vehicle combat requirements

    Any war is a confrontation of combat systems, and advanced systems will present a crushing and rapid victory over backward systems. The strength of drones lies in their built-in small combat system, which integrates reconnaissance, strike, command, coordination, and interference, and can achieve maximum combat effectiveness. With the expansion of combat scenarios, drones have become a new force in the current weapon and equipment system, playing an irreplaceable role in areas such as information support, detection and tracking, and firepower strikes.

    The rich functions and tactics of drones provide many new possibilities for modern warfare. By utilizing the efficient intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities of drones, they can quickly and accurately strike exposed and poorly protected ground forces. For small and medium-sized countries that are unable to maintain a conventional air force, drones are one of the combat platforms that can gain air superiority and asymmetric advantages over their opponents. The "first mover advantage" brought about by military technological progress will make future wars more presented in the form of asymmetric warfare, such as Azerbaijan versus Armenia.

    In the future battlefield, drones will be deployed on the most intense and dangerous front lines, carrying out tasks such as reconnaissance, decoying, jamming, suicide attacks, and implementing saturation or swarm attacks. In this battlefield environment, drones are often positioned as consumable equipment. In addition to low cost and large quantity, they should also have certain intelligence, anti-interference, and self-organizing network capabilities.

The battlefield performance of drones

The Nagorno Karabakh conflict is a military confrontation between two small Central Asian countries, and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is of medium to high intensity. Its basic mode of warfare still follows traditional firepower warfare. Although the participation of drones has added high-tech color to this war, it is not an intelligent war under high-tech conditions. Drones are only used as battlefield reconnaissance and precision strike methods, with insufficient coordination with ground attack forces, and have not been integrated into a complete combat system. From the Nagorno Karabakh War to the Russo Ukrainian War, we have already felt that with the advancement of artificial intelligence/machine learning technology, unmanned aerial vehicle combat scenarios with highly autonomous and collaborative capabilities are not far away from us.

    （1） After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the first Nagorno Karabakh War broke out between Azerbaijan and Armenia from 1992 to 1994. After the ceasefire, there is always friction between the two sides on the actual control line. Affected by multiple factors, in the autumn of 2020 in the Naka region, the two sides once again engaged in military conflict, which lasted for 44 days. In the early stages of the war, the Afghan army launched a ground attack from the lowlands of the southern mountains of Naka towards the highland runners up, deploying ground fighters and armed helicopters in an attempt to capture the defenses that the runners up had painstakingly built over the years. Under the counterattack of the runner up's air defense system, aircraft such as the A-Jun Su-25 were shot down several times. So, the Afghan army changed its attack tactics and achieved overwhelming victory with equipment such as TB-2 drones and HAROP patrol missiles (i.e. suicide drones), writing a brilliant page in the history of drone warfare.

    The military combat ideology of both the Afghan and Asian armies originated from the Soviet Union. After more than 30 years of development, the A army gradually accepted the concept of light composite assault units, while the runner up still adhered to the combat mode of deep defense; The short-range air defense system at the forefront of the runner up is outdated, and even the range of TB-2's airborne weapons exceeds the attack range of the runner up's air defense system. All of these have laid the foundation for the excellent performance of the Afghan military's drones in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

    In order to suppress/destroy the runner up's air defense system, seize air superiority in the theater, and eliminate the enemy's active forces, the Afghan army adopted the following tactics, which were implemented separately and coordinated with each other:

    ① Drones provide aerial protection and information support. Türkiye F-16 fighter planes enter the airspace of Azerbaijan to protect TB-2, Hermes, Heron and other UAV fleets performing follow-up operations from air or anti-aircraft missile attacks; At the same time, Türkiye's E-737 early warning aircraft provides theater intelligence information support.

    ② Drones serve as bait. Using the "KORAL" ground electronic warfare system to interfere with the runner up's radar signal, while retrofitting the old An-2 transport plane into a remote-controlled drone and loading it with explosives, luring the runner up's medium and short-range radar to turn on, and then locating and clearing it at a fixed point.

    ③ Drone reconnaissance, positioning, and attack. After detecting targets (including some false targets set by the runner up) in the air, the TB-2 unmanned aerial vehicle and other fleets of hunters will transmit battlefield information back to the command center. For individual targets and small units, use their own MAM-L precision guided missiles for destruction; For cluster targets such as anti-aircraft positions and armored vehicles, guide artillery and fighter jets to conduct intensive strikes; At the same time, coordinated command of patrol missiles such as Harop and SkyStriker continues to disable exposed air defense systems. There are also reports that TB-2 guided the Afghan artillery to destroy the Russian made S-300 air defense missile system, and Harop destroyed the runner up's "dewormer-1" anti drone electronic warfare system, both of which are said to be the first in the history of drone warfare.

    ④ Assessment of drone damage. After the first wave of strikes, the TB-2 drone sends reconnaissance images and other information back to the command and control center based on the battlefield situation to determine whether to launch a second wave of strikes. According to open-source information data, the pre war runners up had a total of 40 sets of air defense systems. After this battle, the runner up lost a total of 26 air defense systems and 14 radars.

    ⑤ Unmanned aerial vehicle deep reconnaissance. After gaining air superiority, the A army greatly weakened the runner up's geographical advantage of using mountains as a natural barrier. After the defense works were lost, the runner up's equipment and personnel retreated along the road, and drones could easily find targets such as tanks, artillery, or vehicle assembly areas. The Ah Jun drone effectively guided artillery firing, allowing artillery that was originally only advantageous in plain areas to achieve the same annihilation effect.

    ⑥ Ah Jun utilizes the real-time feedback capability of drones to continuously post frontline combat videos or images of ground targets on various social media platforms, in order to boost morale and shock the psychology of opponents, thereby receiving good public opinion benefits.

    Through the above methods, it can be clearly seen that the combat style of the A army's high and low combinations includes both the protection of drones, the coordination between drones, and the play of different roles of drones. The main technical parameters, performance, and usage conditions of these drones vary, and they can undertake different types of combat tasks during operations, which also demonstrates the intelligence of the Afghan military's tactical adjustments.

    The highlight of this battle is the stunning performance of the Ah army's unmanned aerial vehicle equipment, which has attracted great attention from countries around the world. But people intentionally or unintentionally overlook the invisible coordination of "electronic warfare". The wing span (12.0m) of TB-2 manufactured in Türkiye is larger than that of F-16 (9.5m), and its radar characteristics should be higher than that of F-16. If there were no electromagnetic signal suppression or deception, TB-2 would not be able to approach the runner up's air defense system at all. The video of the runner up radar being destroyed and its antenna still rotating inefficiently, released by A Jun, illustrates that electronic warfare applications are also an important component of this unmanned aerial vehicle operation.

    Although the Afghan military's drones have demonstrated strong combat capabilities, the ultimate intention of the two sides is still to rely on ground forces to achieve territorial disputes. As the attack progressed, the military operations of the Afghan army shifted from the overwhelming advantage of unmanned aerial vehicles in attrition warfare to diverse tactics in assault warfare. According to incomplete statistics, 2763 soldiers of the Afghan army were killed, and 2718 runners up were killed in action. Although the personnel losses on both sides were comparable, there is reason to believe that the reduction of the runner up was mainly caused by drones, while most of the casualties of the Afghan army occurred in ground combat. There are reports that in the first week of the war, the runner up resisted tenaciously, and the Afghan army only advanced less than 20 kilometers towards mountainous highlands. It can be seen that if the Afghan army integrates drones into a complete combat system, that is, effectively coordinating air strikes and ground attacks, the number of personnel losses in the Afghan army will not be so large.

    （2） Russia-Ukraine conflict In February 2022, Russia launched a "special military operation" against Ukraine, aiming to quickly achieve military and political goals through Blitzkrieg. Unexpectedly, the Russia-Ukraine conflict gradually entered a stalemate due to the stubborn resistance of the Ukrainian army and the subsequent NATO arms and information assistance, as well as the lack of Russian military preparations. Both sides constantly switched their offensive and defensive roles in the "attack counterattack" cycle, and the expected lightning battle slowly dragged on to a protracted one.

    In the early stages of the war, the Russian offensive team was responsible for breaking through the Ukrainian defense front and successfully controlling some cities; The assault team is responsible for deep strikes, but the troops are insufficient, making it difficult to carry out flank encirclement and annihilate the Ukrainian heavy army group. The attack is difficult to achieve, the retreat is unwilling, and both sides do not have air superiority, causing the situation to become deadlocked. The Ukrainian army retreated into the city and defended themselves. After identifying the weak points of the enemy, they continuously attacked the Russian army through guerrilla warfare in small teams, accumulating small victories to become major victories. After being defeated, the Russian army shifted from "deep attack" to "firepower main battle" tactics, and the effectiveness of the Ukrainian army's small squad's attack tactics decreased. The overall strength of the Ukrainian army is weak, and the only way to confront it is to rely on NATO military aid and compete with the Russian army.

    In the above context, the Ukrainian military, which lacked basic ammunition and precision guided weapons inventory, found that drones were indispensable. Therefore, they used TB-2 military drones to launch multiple deep attacks on the Russian military, including sinking the Russian "Raptor" patrol boat, shooting down the Mi-8 helicopter over Snake Island, and assisting in the attack on the "Moscow" missile cruiser, all of which achieved remarkable results. On the contrary, the Russian military initially did not value the tactical value of drones. With the deployment of electronic warfare and air defense systems by the Russian military, the Ukrainian TB-2 has been continuously shot down, significantly reducing the combat effectiveness of unmanned aerial vehicles.

    Given that large and medium-sized drones such as MQ-9 and TB-2 are vulnerable to attacks from enemy air defense and anti drone systems, the Ukrainian military has turned its attention to small drones, especially commercial ones. Small unmanned aerial vehicles typically have a certain load-bearing capacity and excellent secondary development capabilities. By installing various task modules, they can play different roles in military operations and can be widely used for battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance, low altitude raids, relay communication, target indication, and damage effectiveness evaluation. With the support of the government and the assistance of civilian forces, the modification technology used by the Ukrainian military is not advanced high-tech, but mature technology that is cheap and easy to introduce. Small commercial drones equipped with explosives of different effects have achieved good results in attacking Russian supply lines, tanks or armored personnel carriers, armed personnel, and infrastructure. As the confrontation intensifies, the Russian military is gradually learning from the experience of the Ukrainian military and surpassing them in certain tactical applications of drones.

    Although commercial drones are more vulnerable on the battlefield than military drones, they are equipped in large quantities due to their low cost and lack of complex ground infrastructure such as runways and ground stations. At present, in terms of destructive effects, the three types of drones are the most widely used and influential, namely:

    ① Patrol missile, a suicide drone with beyond visual range strike capability that roams over the target area.

    ② Unidirectional attack drones, also known as the "Divine Wind" special attack team, can accurately strike point-to-point and self destruct upon reaching their location.

    ③ FPV drones, also known as first person perspective drones, can launch surprise attacks on fast-moving targets within a range of 12 kilometers and evade stationary targets.

    The concept of FPV unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has emerged in the Russian Ukrainian battlefield, and the Ukrainian military has creatively transformed the platform that originally carried out remote operations, such as ground surveillance and long-range killing, into a tool for delivering explosives at close range and improving artillery accuracy at a low cost. For small unmanned aerial vehicle systems weighing less than 150 kilograms, the Ukrainian military's incremental advantage in commercial unmanned aerial vehicle applications ultimately improves the cost-effectiveness of unmanned aerial vehicle operations. This retrofitting approach reflects the degree of reliance of combat units such as platoons or individual soldiers on unmanned aerial vehicles.

    After more than 800 days of war, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has become the first comprehensive drone war. At the beginning of the war, the types of unmanned aerial vehicles available to Russia and Ukraine have developed from over 20 before the war to over 70 currently, and are compatible with more than 20 types of ammunition. Among them, Tu-141 and Tu-143 are mainly used for reconnaissance, collecting intelligence, providing real-time images, improving situational awareness and combat accuracy; Orlan-10 and Aerostar are mainly used for surveillance, continuously monitoring enemy movements and locations, maintaining strategic advantages, and making tactical adjustments possible; TB-2, Harop, Orbiter 1K, SkyStriker, Lancet, Switchblade are mainly used for strikes, equipped with weapon systems and performing precise strikes, changing the traditional combat mode. On the 1000 kilometer long stalemate between Russia and Ukraine, there are usually 25-50 drones shuttling between the two sides in the middle area every 10 kilometers or so.

    Within 19 months of the war, although the Ukrainian military deployed 3.8 times more drones than the Russian military, the Russian military utilized medium to short-range air defense systems and powerful electronic warfare capabilities (jamming sensors and unencrypted satellite navigation systems or communication links of commercial drones) to destroy a large number of Ukrainian drones. In terms of the number of drone attacks, the success rate of the Ukrainian army is 14.3%, far lower than the 54.0% of the Russian army; From the perspective of intercepting drones, the success rate of the Ukrainian military is 43.3%, which is also lower than the 85.1% of the Russian military. The above data indicates that the comprehensive utilization capability of Russian unmanned aerial vehicles is slightly higher. Both sides' drones have gradually evolved into disposable equipment, with an expected lifespan of only 5-6 sorties.

    In terms of technological innovation in the use of drones, the Ukrainian military is one step ahead. For example, in terms of informatization, this is undoubtedly supported by NATO's information support and satellite links, as well as the promotion of Ukrainian civilian research and development. A digital map called "Delta" integrates information from drones, radar, smartphones, satellite images, and open-source intelligence networks, which can clearly display the size, firepower, location, and other information of the Ukrainian military and opponents within a certain range on handheld tablets or mobile phones, providing real-time battlefield information for combat units as low as platoon level. Similar software includes GIS Arta, Kropyva and other apps. This type of innovative situational awareness tool means that different combat units can coordinate organically, enabling artillery to quickly share the coordinates of enemy units, accelerate the aiming process, and shorten the kill chain time from target acquisition to shooting - which used to take about 30 minutes - to 3-5 minutes.

    Throughout the more than two years of warfare, what we have seen are only individual unmanned aerial vehicle reconnaissance, artillery calibration, or close range attacks, with few reports or videos of groups of unmanned aerial vehicle fleets fighting. This phenomenon indicates that, given the powerful reconnaissance and strike capabilities of drones, dispersed operations must be carried out by platoons and platoons. Therefore, the current application of drones is concentrated at the level of combat teams and is almost an essential individual equipment. Small commercial unmanned aerial vehicles have limited ammunition capacity and limited killing range; For combat operations of battalion or brigade scale, military drones with medium to long endurance are required to carry out large-scale reconnaissance, surveillance, or attack missions. In addition, how to identify friend or foe is also a challenge for the application of drone fleets in response to the numerous drone swarms over the battlefield.

    Except for a few mountainous areas in the southwest, Ukraine's vast land is flat and connected by rural areas between cities. In plain warfare, traditional ground military forces rely on cover or trenches to fight inch by inch for land. In this situation, drones can efficiently play a unique role, cooperating with ground military forces to clear, control, and defend territory. Especially for flexible and maneuverable FPVs, once they see the target, they can basically lock onto and destroy it. Due to the current stalemate between Russia and Ukraine, it is difficult for large-scale combat to occur in a short period of time. Therefore, the drones of the Russian and Ukrainian armies are mainly used for "surprise attacks", similar to "firing cold guns", making it difficult for opponents to respond.

The impact of drones on future battlefields

    With the increasing application of drones, traditional ground armor, mechanization, and mobile formations are highly vulnerable to advanced drone combat weapons and concepts. Without powerful air detection and anti drone weapons, traditional ground forces will face great difficulties in the future. Facing the future application of drones, especially drone swarms, it is urgent to develop new electronic warfare methods and traditional firepower air defense systems.

    When one side gains an advantage through the use of drones, the other side will also strengthen their drone capabilities to narrow the gap, which will lead to a drone arms race between the two sides. When this competition reaches equilibrium, the weapon to break it is anti drone equipment. Therefore, in the foreseeable future, various anti drone equipment will be essential weapon platforms for the next war.